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NOTE
NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS, NATIONAL PARKS,
AND THE CUTTER TEST
JAMES DOHNALEK*
INTRODUCTION
Religious accommodations can be a highly controversial subject in to-
day’s society. Whether these accommodations take the form of the govern-
ment allowing sacramental use of an otherwise illegal drug to certain
religious adherents, or exempting corporations on religious grounds from
the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act, there is no shortage
of people with opinions on the matter. One area that is particularly ripe for
debate is religious accommodations in national parks, given the govern-
ment’s recent activity in managing national parks.1
Accommodations are defined as “government laws or policies that
have the purpose and effect of removing a burden on, or facilitating the
exercise of, a person’s or an institution’s religion.”2 In religious contexts,
accommodations protect certain religious exercises by “declaring that other-
wise valid regulations should not be applied in ways that significantly inter-
fere with the religious freedom of organizations or individuals.”3 These
laws and policies that provide special treatment to certain religious prac-
tices often raise constitutional issues due to the Establishment Clause of the
* J.D., University of St. Thomas School of Law; B.A., University of St. Thomas. The
author would like to thank Professor Thomas C. Berg for his wisdom and guidance on matters of
religious accommodations. The author is also grateful to Professor Neil Hamilton for his mentor-
ship. Finally, the author would like to thank his mother for her support.
1. Angela Hart, California Moves to Block National Park Fee Increases, THE SACRAMENTO
BEE (Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article18605
7603.html; Nadja Popovich, Bears Ears National Monument Is Shrinking. Here’s What Is Being
Cut., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/08/climate/bears-
ears-monument-trump.html.
2. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992).
3. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 103, 105 (2015).
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First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits the fed-
eral government from establishing a religion.
As will be discussed in this article, certain religious accommodations
should be provided to Native Americans in national parks, including waiver
of the park’s entrance fee, access to otherwise restricted sites in the park
that hold religious significance, and allowing Native Americans to access
the park when it is closed. This article will examine these accommodations
under the test that the Supreme Court of the United States laid out in Cutter
v. Wilkinson for determining the constitutionality of statutory accommoda-
tions.4 These accommodations will then be assessed as to how they affect
third parties. Finally, the denominational neutrality requirement of Cutter’s
third prong will be considered.
I. LAND AND NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
Prior to analyzing accommodations for Native American religious ex-
ercise in national parks, one must first understand the unique nature of Na-
tive American religions. In most contexts, Native American religions
cannot be thought of as a singular concept due to the great variation of
religious beliefs between the different tribes.5 However, one common ele-
ment of most Native American religions is that they tend to place a great
amount of spiritual value in land.6 The site-specific nature of Indian relig-
ious practice derives from the Native American perception that land is itself
a sacred, living being.7
Oftentimes land that is designated as a national park also holds relig-
ious value to local Native Americans.8 When analyzing the issue of Native
American religious exercise in national parks or other public lands, it must
4. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
5. Religious Freedom & Sacred Places, NAT’L CONGRESS OF NATIVE AM. INDIANS, http://
www.ncai.org/policy-issues/community-and-culture/rel-freedom-and-sacred-places (last visited
July 1, 2018) (“In the United States, there are 566 federally recognized tribes that speak hundreds
of different Native languages. With the vast geographic, linguistic, and cultural diversity that
exists among tribes, it is impossible to refer to Native American religion or spirituality in the
singular context. Native religions and traditions vastly differ from tribe to tribe. . .”).
6. See generally Joel Brady, “Land Is Itself a Sacred, Living Being”: Native American
Sacred Site Protection on Federal Public Lands Amidst The Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 153 (2000) (“At the center of most Native American belief systems is the basic
tenet that religion and faith draws heavily upon sacred lands.”); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property
Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place of Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1061 (2005).
7. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 461 (1988).
8. See National Register of Historic Places and National Historic Landmarks Programs,
NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/history/tribes/NR_NHL.htm (last visited July 1, 2018);
Geoff Montes, Sacred Native American Sites: Bear Butte and Wind Cave, NAT’L TRUST FOR HIST.
PRESERVATION (June 16, 2015), https://savingplaces.org/stories/sacred-native-american-sites-bear-
butte-and-wind-cave#.WiYoXxNSzaY; Alysa Landry, Native History: Yellowstone National Park
Created on Sacred Land, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 1, 2017), https://indiancountrymedianet
work.com/history/events/native-history-yellowstone-national-park-created-on-sacred-land/; Public
Lands, Sacred Sites, and Native American Youth, THE ASPEN INST., https://assets.aspeninstitute
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be viewed through the lens that certain practices can hold religious signifi-
cance to Native Americans only if such practices are performed on that
specific area of land. Justice Brennan reaffirmed this point in his Lyng dis-
sent: “Rituals are performed in prescribed locations not merely as a matter
of traditional orthodoxy, but because land, like all other living things, is
unique, and specific sites possess different spiritual properties and signifi-
cance. Within this belief system, therefore, land is not fungible[.]”9
Because many Native American religious beliefs and practices are site-
specific, reasonable accommodations should be made to those Native
Americans when the religiously significant area is situated on public land,
or more specifically, within a national park. Such reasonable accommoda-
tions that should be provided to Native Americans include removing the
park entrance fee, dismissing access restrictions to sites holding religious
value, and allowing entrance when the park is closed. These accommoda-
tions would eliminate many of the burdens on Native American religious
practices within national parks.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CUTTER
The legal framework for analyzing accommodations begins with the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause requires that “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion[.]”10 This is intended to prohibit the govern-
ment from creating or supporting a national religion. Thus, the Establish-
ment Clause is often viewed as preventing the government from providing
favorable treatment to certain religions.
However, the Establishment Clause is often in conflict with another
provision of the First Amendment. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause prevents Congress from making a law “prohibiting the free exer-
cise” of religion.11 Consequently, a tension exists between avoiding relig-
ious favoritism under the Establishment Clause, and not restricting religious
practices under the Free Exercise Clause. This tension makes the issue of
religious accommodations incredibly challenging. Accommodations are de-
fined as “government laws or policies that have the purpose and effect of
removing a burden on, or facilitating the exercise of, a person’s or an insti-
tution’s religion.”12 While some argue that accommodations by their very
nature violate the Establishment Clause,13 the Supreme Court of the United
.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/My%20Native%20Voice%20Fact%20Sheet%20Update
.pdf (last visited July 1, 2018).
9. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 461.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Id.
12. McConnell, supra note 2, at 686.
13. See Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1990).
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States has rejected this idea.14 Instead, the Supreme Court has stated that
“‘there is room for play in the joints between’ the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion be-
yond free exercise requirements, without offense to the Establishment
Clause.”15
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court of the United States ex-
amined the constitutionality of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). In doing so, the Supreme Court created a test that
defines when a statutory accommodation strikes the right balance between
allowing free exercise and avoiding establishment. According to the Cutter
test, a statutory religious accommodation is constitutional under the Estab-
lishment Clause as long as it “(1) alleviate[s] exceptional government-cre-
ated burdens on private religious exercise, (2) take[s] adequate account of
the burdens imposed on nonbeneficiaries, and (3) satisf[ies] the principle of
denominational neutrality.”16
The proposed religious accommodations for Native Americans set
forth in this article are similar to the religious accommodations provided by
RLUIPA. The accommodations in both scenarios are provided by legisla-
tive action. Given this similarity, it is appropriate to analyze the constitu-
tionality of the Native American accommodations in the same manner in
which the constitutionality of RLUIPA was analyzed; by using the Cutter
test. However, before using the Cutter test to analyze the proposed accom-
modations, two points of uncertainty surrounding Cutter must be discussed.
First, what does the phrase “take adequate account” in Cutter’s second
prong really mean? Second, there is debate as to whether legislatures should
have the discretion to grant religious accommodations, or whether legisla-
tures may only provide accommodations when a court directs it to do so.17
14. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987).
15. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713.
16. Id. at 720 (“[1] Foremost, we find RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision compat-
ible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional government-created burdens
on private religious exercise. See Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (government need not ‘be oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises
of state power may place on religious belief and practice’); Amos, 483 U.S., at 349 (O’CONNOR,
J., concurring in judgment) (removal of government-imposed burdens on religious exercise is
more likely to be perceived ‘as an accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a
Government endorsement of religion’). Furthermore, the Act on its face does not founder on
shoals our prior decisions have identified: [2] Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take ade-
quate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries, see
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); and [3] they must be satisfied that the
Act’s prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different faiths, see Kiryas Joel,
512 U.S. 687”); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THOMAS C. BERG & CHRISTOPHER C. LUND, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 241 (Wolters Kluwer, 4th ed. 2016).
17. See Berg, supra note 3, at 147; McConnell, supra note 2, at 722–26; Ira C. Lupu, Recon-
structing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 605–06 (1991). See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative
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A. What Does the Phrase “Take Adequate Account” in Cutter’s Second
Prong Mean?
Cutter’s second prong states that an “adequate account of the burdens
a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries” must be
taken.18 Based on words alone, it is not entirely clear what this means. Is
this directing the reader to compare the third party’s burdens against the
religious adherent’s burdens, effectively weighing the first and second
prongs against each other? Or is each prong isolated and analyzed sepa-
rately from the other?
There is a strong argument in favor of reading the Cutter test as weigh-
ing the burdens in the first and second prong against each other.19 Professor
Thomas Berg cites to three reasons why the Cutter test should be read as
weighing burdens against each other: case law, historical foundations, and
the deference usually given to legislative decisions.20
Berg’s case law argument is particularly compelling, in which he cites
and describes the case of Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.21 In Caldor, the
Supreme Court of the Unites States invalidated a statute giving employees
the right not to work on the day of the employee’s Sabbath.22 In coming to
this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered the fact that the statute im-
posed a large burden on employers and other employees who had to ac-
count for the religiously observant employee’s absence. However, the
Court’s analysis did not end there. The Supreme Court also analyzed the
burden on the religious employee, specifically finding that the burden was
created not by the state, but rather the private employer.23 The interests of
the third parties far outweighed the burdens imposed by the private em-
ployer onto the religious employee.
The Court continued this method of analysis of weighing burdens in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. Amos. In Amos, the Court examined a law where religious
Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with
Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992).
18. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
19. Berg, supra note 3, at 143 (“The validity of this argument turns on how stringently the
test of Cutter is applied—and it should not be applied stringently. Under the Cutter test, the
burden the accommodation imposes on others is not determinative: it must be weighed, if only in a
rough way, against the burden the accommodation removes from sincere religious practice.”).
20. Id. at 143–47. Berg’s second reason for reading Cutter as weighing the burdens against
each other is the theoretical foundations of the Establishment Clause, in which he examines the
rejection of the “benefit of clergy” accommodation in America. Finally, Berg’s third reason looks
at the deference usually given to legislative judgment. Berg discusses how in many non-religious
contexts, legislatures are entrusted to “define legal harms in order to balance competing
interests[.]”
21. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Berg, supra note 3, at 143–44.
22. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710–11.
23. Id. at 709–11.
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organizations were exempted from a ban on discriminatory hiring.24 The
discriminatory hiring practices undoubtedly presented a burden to third par-
ties seeking employment. However, the Supreme Court upheld the exemp-
tion because it “prevented potentially serious encroachments on protected
religious freedoms.”25 In doing so, the Supreme Court considered the harms
to both the religious organizations and the third parties.26
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s practice of balancing the relig-
ious adherent’s burdens without accommodation against the third party’s
burdens with accommodation, this article will read the Cutter test to weigh
the first and second prongs against each other. The burdens suffered by the
Native Americans engaged in religious practice in a national park without
accommodations should be assessed against the burdens imposed on non-
Native American visitors to national parks.
B. The Debate Over Legislative Discretion
One of the most intense debates surrounding Cutter and religious ac-
commodations is whether a legislature should have the discretion to accom-
modate even when it is not required to do so.27 In other words, is it
permissible for a legislature to accommodate religious exercise absent di-
rection from a court? Scholars are sharply divided on this issue.
This legislative discretion debate often centers on whether legislatures
possess the prudence and acumen to grant nonessential accommodations.
Professor Ira Lupu, one of the leading advocates against legislative discre-
tion, believes that granting legislatures such discretion will lead to inequal-
ity.28 Specifically, Lupu believes that allowing discretion over religious
accommodations will result in legislatures providing special treatment for
religious concerns, and will enable certain legislatures to favor the domi-
nant religion over other religions.29 Under this view, it is necessary to con-
fine the decision-making over accommodations to the courts in order to
reduce unequal treatment and the marginalization of unpopular religions.30
24. Amos, 483 U.S. at 331.
25. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (discussing the Amos
decision).
26. Amos, 483 U.S. at 336–38.
27. See supra note 17.
28. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accom-
modation of Religion, supra note 17, at 605–06. See generally Lupu, The Case Against Legislative
Codification of Religious Liberty, supra note 17; Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, supra
note 17.
29. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accom-
modation of Religion, supra note 17, at 605–06 (“[A]ccommodations by state legislatures will 1)
create a nonuniform pattern of special treatment for religious concerns; 2) present an aggravated
risk of special treatment for religions dominant in particular states; and 3) create the further risk of
invidiously omitted accommodations for those religions which are in disfavor.”).
30. Id. at 600–05.
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One of the leading scholars in support of legislative discretion, Profes-
sor Michael McConnell, points to the fact that legislatures are given discre-
tion in other, non-religious contexts. Specifically, McConnell states:
[l]egislative discretion in other areas of constitutional concern is
not confined to the bare requirements of the Constitution. The
political branches are entitled, within their delegated authority, to
secure the blessings of liberty and promote the values of the Bill
of Rights in ways that go beyond what courts could require. Why
should the free exercise of religion be an exception? Of course,
the substantive scope of permissible accommodation is limited by
the Establishment Clause (just as the scope of permissible affirm-
ative action is limited by the Equal Protection Clause). But the
Establishment Clause limits the type of action all branches of
government may take; it provides no warrant for the proposition
that courts may accommodate while legislatures cannot.31
McConnell likens legislative discretion over religious accommodations
to legislative discretion over racial discrimination. While courts may be the
best decision makers for issues involving race, it would be preposterous to
suggest that legislatures should be prevented from enacting laws protecting
racial minorities.32 Professor Thomas Berg furthers this argument by apply-
ing this principle to the context of same-sex marriage accommodations:
If we presume that modern regulators have leeway to define legal
harms in order to balance competing interests, then surely they
should have leeway to protect religious freedom along with other
statutory interests. It would make little sense, for example, to say
that a state that recognized same-sex marriage could not simulta-
neously exempt the small wedding photographer, in order to bal-
ance the two rights. Why is it any different if the legislature
responds to a court decision ordering same-sex marriage than if
the legislature enacts the accommodation at the time it recognizes
marriage legislatively?33
The argument in favor of legislative discretion is more compelling.
While the concern over unequal treatment raised by those opposed to legis-
lative discretion is absolutely justified, the fact remains that legislatures are
31. McConnell, supra note 2, at 723–24.
32. Id. at 723 (“But this is equally true of many other issues of constitutional dimension. For
example, racial discrimination—both against minorities and on their behalf—is a knotty problem,
entailing great risk of unprincipled and racist decisionmaking. For all the reasons Lupu rehearses,
courts might well be the best decision makers. But no one would contend that Congress should
have been kept from passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or that states and localities should be
barred from enacting local codes and ordinances forbidding discrimination. Indeed, in the espe-
cially sensitive area of affirmative action, the prevailing view is that Congress—pursuant to its
section five authority—has broad latitude to engage in affirmative action, even though the courts’
authority to do so is limited to circumstances in which affirmative action is a narrowly tailored
remedy for a specific constitutional violation.”).
33. Berg, supra note 3, at 147.
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often given the power to govern other issues where the interests of under-
represented or vulnerable groups are at stake. It is also worth noting that
legislatures, like courts, take an oath to support and uphold the Constitu-
tion.34 Opponents of legislative discretion have failed to put forth a con-
vincing argument as to how these religious issues are distinct from other
issues like racial or gender equality. Accordingly, for the sake of consis-
tency among these similar issues, legislative discretion should also extend
to religious accommodations.
III. ANALYZING NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
UNDER CUTTER
This section analyzes the proposed Native American religious accom-
modations using the Cutter test. In doing so, the burdens on Native Ameri-
cans absent accommodation are identified and weighed against the burdens
the accommodations impose upon third parties. Finally, the denominational
neutrality prong is analyzed.
A. Alleviating an Exceptional Government Burden?
The first prong of the Cutter test asks whether the exemption “allevi-
ates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exer-
cise.”35 The definition of an “exceptional burden” is not clearly defined, but
the language used by the Cutter court itself suggests that “exceptional” is
akin to “substantial.” In examining RLUIPA’s Section 3 prohibition against
the government imposing “substantial burden[s]” upon a prisoner’s relig-
ious exercise, the Court stated that Section 3 of RLUIPA “alleviates excep-
tional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.”36 With no
distinction made between the terms “exceptional” and “substantial,” the
Court’s statement that a law prohibiting “substantial” burdens results in al-
leviating “exceptional” burdens hints that there is very little difference, if
any, between the terms. Several district courts citing Cutter seem to adopt
the view that the terms are interchangeable, mentioning that Section 3 of
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also McConnell, supra note 2, at 722–23 (“This conception of
judicial exclusivity in the enforcement of the Constitution is utterly foreign to our legal system.
The commands of the Constitution are addressed to all persons exercising authority under it; that
is why our senators and representatives, and executive as well as judicial officers, at both the state
and the federal level, are required to take an oath to support the Constitution. Judicial review is not
even mentioned in the Constitution. The First Amendment applies to the states by incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment; Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment vests the author-
ity to enforce that Amendment in the Congress. I cannot fathom on what theory Professor Lupu
contends that legislators and executive officers are forbidden to conform their acts to constitu-
tional requirements.”).
35. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
36. Id.
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RLUIPA (which only references “substantial burdens”) was designed to al-
leviate “exceptional” burdens.37
Additionally, while “exceptional” may sound more demanding than
“substantial” to some readers, under the theory of legislative discretion dis-
cussed earlier, it is well within a legislature’s authority to determine what
constitutes an exceptional burden on religious exercise.38 Congress could
very well decide that an exceptional burden is no more serious than a sub-
stantial burden, or perhaps even less.
As mentioned previously, certain accommodations should be given to
Native Americans seeking to engage in religious exercises in a national
park, including allowing Native Americans to enter the park for free, per-
mitting Native Americans to access restricted areas of the park, and al-
lowing Native Americans to visit the park for religious purposes, even
when it is closed. In order to fulfill the first prong of Cutter, these accom-
modations must alleviate an exceptional government-created burden. The
following subsections will examine some possible government-created bur-
dens that harm Native Americans wishing to engage in religious exercises
in a park, including tourism in the park, entrance fees, and restricted access
to certain areas within the park.
1. Tourism
One of the possible government-created burdens to the Native Ameri-
cans is tourism to the religious site. If the government designates an area as
a national park, the area will likely see increased tourism. The increased
tourism may in turn make Native American religious practice more diffi-
cult. With more tourists would come more noise, more people walking near
the spiritual site, and less privacy. Native Americans seeking to practice
religious exercises in the park may claim that these factors make their prac-
tice more difficult, and thus the government has created an exceptional
burden.
One of the landmark decisions on what constitutes a burden is Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective. In Lyng, the United States Forest
Service constructed a paved road through Chimney Rock, an area of Six
Rivers National Forest.39 Chimney Rock was used by the local Native
37. See Guess v. McGill, No. 13-CV-02260, 2014 WL 5106735, at *10 (D.S.C. Oct. 10,
2014) (citing Cutter and stating that “RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provisions was intended
to alleviate only ‘exceptional’ burdens on religious exercise[.]”); Hall v. Martin, No. 1:11 CV 416,
2012 WL 1536457, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2012) (citing Cutter and “recognizing that
RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provision was intended to alleviate only ‘exceptional’ burdens
on religious exercise”); Trotter v. Ramsey, No. 13-1087-JDT/EGB, 2015 WL 4163345, at *4
(W.D. Tenn. July 9, 2015) (citing Cutter and stating that “RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons
provision was intended to alleviate only exceptional burdens on religious exercise”); see also
Selby v. Caruso, No. 2:09-CV-152, 2010 WL 3892209, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2010).
38. See Berg, supra note 3, at 103–51; McConnell, supra note 2, at 685–742.
39. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
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Americans for religious purposes, and the land was considered sacred.40
The Native Americans opposed the construction of the road, claiming it was
a burden on their exercise of religion. Specifically, the road would disrupt
their religious rituals, as their religious rituals required “privacy, silence,
and an undisturbed natural setting.”41
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled against the Native
Americans, finding that their burden was not great enough. The Court stated
that significant government interference with one’s ability to “pursue spiri-
tual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs” is not a heavy
enough burden.42 Instead, to constitute a significant enough burden, the in-
dividual must “be coerced by the Government’s action into violating their
religious beliefs.”43
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lyng was rooted in a prior burden
case, Bowen v. Roy, which examined a federal statute requiring states ad-
ministering certain welfare programs to use the recipient’s Social Security
number.44 A Native American man claimed his religious beliefs prevented
him from providing his daughter’s Social Security number, as doing so
would “‘rob the spirit’ of his daughter and prevent her from attaining
greater spiritual power.”45 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stat-
ing that the government is not required to
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens. . .[t]he Free Exercise
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of gov-
ernmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to
dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.46
Lyng’s rule that no substantial burden exists when a government action
merely makes a religious exercise more difficult has been applied in other
Native American religious exercise cases. In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v.
F.E.R.C., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved a hydroe-
lectricity project on the Snoqualmie River near Seattle.47 The project would
affect the water flow of the Snoqualmie Falls down river and eliminate the
mist created by the waterfall. The Snoqualmie Tribe opposed the project,
claiming it represented a substantial burden on their religion because the
waterfall was sacred, and its mist was necessary for their vision quests. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the Tribe’s claims, stating that the
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 449.
43. Id.
44. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
45. Id. at 696.
46. Id. at 699–700.
47. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 545 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Tribe’s arguments that the dam interferes with the ability of tribal
members to practice religion are irrelevant to whether the hydroe-
lectric project either forces them to choose between practicing
their religion and receiving a government benefit or coerces them
into a Catch-22 situation: exercise of their religion under fear of
civil or criminal sanction.48
In Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Forest Service ap-
proved the use of treated wastewater to create artificial snow at the
Snowbowl ski area in Arizona.49 The Snowbowl ski area was located on a
set of peaks that held religious and cultural significance to the local Native
American tribes. The tribes complained that the snow made from treated
wastewater, containing .0001 percent human waste, “desecrate[d] the entire
mountain, deprecate[d] their religious ceremonies, and injure[d] their relig-
ious sensibilities.”50 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Native Americans’ argu-
ment, declaring that
[t]he use of recycled wastewater on a ski area that covers one
percent of the Peaks does not force the Plaintiffs to choose be-
tween following the tenets of their religion and receiving a gov-
ernmental benefit, as in Sherbert. The use of recycled wastewater
to make artificial snow also does not coerce the Plaintiffs to act
contrary to their religion under the threat of civil or criminal sanc-
tions, as in Yoder. The Plaintiffs are not fined or penalized in any
way for practicing their religion on the Peaks or on the
Snowbowl. Quite the contrary: the Forest Service “has guaranteed
that religious practitioners would still have access to the
Snowbowl” and the rest of the Peaks for religious purposes.
The only effect of the proposed upgrades is on the Plaintiffs’ sub-
jective, emotional religious experience. That is, the presence of
recycled wastewater on the Peaks is offensive to the Plaintiffs’
religious sensibilities. To plaintiffs, it will spiritually desecrate a
sacred mountain and will decrease the spiritual fulfillment they
get from practicing their religion on the mountain. Nevertheless,
under Supreme Court precedent, the diminishment of spiritual ful-
fillment—serious though it may be—is not a “substantial burden”
on the free exercise of religion.51
Thus, the Lyng and Roy decisions, as well as those following Lyng,
refused to find a substantial burden unless the government coerced an indi-
vidual into violating their religious beliefs. Government action that merely
makes religious practice more difficult does not constitute an exceptional
burden.
48. Id. at 1214.
49. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2008).
50. Id. at 1062–63.
51. Id. at 1070.
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A government act designating a religiously significant area as a na-
tional park, and therefore increasing tourism, is very similar to the facts of
Lyng, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, and Navajo Nation. The burden of in-
creased tourists that accompanies a designation as a national park, and sub-
sequently more noise and less privacy, appears to be no different than
building a road close to a religious site, using treated wastewater to cover a
spiritual site with snow, or eliminating mist from a sacred waterfall. The
common feature in each of these situations is that the government has made
religious practice more difficult.52 However, none of these situations coerce
the individual to violate their beliefs.
Strictly applying Lyng, courts would likely find no exceptional burden
in a scenario where Native American sacred land became a national park.
The noise and lack of privacy of increased traffic to sacred land could cer-
tainly make the Native Americans’ religious exercise more difficult, as Na-
tive American religious practices may require an undisturbed natural
setting. Nevertheless, the increased noise and decreased privacy would not
coerce the Native Americans into violating their beliefs. By designating
sacred land as a national park and increasing tourism, the government is not
forcing the Native Americans to abandon their beliefs in order to comply
with the law. For this reason, under Lyng, it cannot be said that increased
tourism to a sacred area, caused by the government designating it as a na-
tional park, places an exceptional burden on the Native Americans.
However, there is a significant distinction between the cases that apply
Lyng and a situation where sacred land is designated as a national park.
Designation of land as a national park generally only occurs through an act
of Congress.53 As such, Congress may be inclined to also provide accom-
modations to Native Americans to whom that land contains religious value.
The plaintiffs in Lyng, Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, and Navajo Nation, on the
other hand, instead sought accommodations through the courts.
This distinction between who is providing the accommodation, a legis-
lature or a court, is important because the courts in Lyng and the subsequent
cases were bound to provide accommodation only when accommodation
52. One may argue that Lyng is not even applicable because the harms from tourism (noise,
less privacy) are imposed not by the government, but rather by private parties (the tourists). How-
ever, this argument seems contrary even to Lyng. In Lyng the issue was noise created from traffic
on a logging road near a Native American spiritual site. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442. Presumably, not all
of the logging road’s traffic noise came from government vehicles; it is almost certain that some
of the traffic creating noise on the road was caused by private individuals. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court found this burden to be government created. See id. at 449. In the context of declar-
ing sacred land as a national park, it is the government’s action of designating that land as a
national park that is enabling the increased noise and distraction. This is consistent with the Lyng
court holding the government responsible for noise created by private citizens driving on a public
road. As such, any noise created by tourism would likely be attributed to the government in a
burdens analysis under Cutter.
53. America’s Public Lands Explained, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/
blog/americas-public-lands-explained (last visited July 1, 2018).
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was required. Legislatures, on the other hand, should be given the discre-
tion to decide what constitutes an exceptional burden on religious exercise,
and consequently provide accommodations even when such accommoda-
tions are not required.54
As the preceding discussion applying Lyng demonstrates, the increased
tourism could have a significant negative impact on Native American relig-
ious exercise. If Congress were to provide religious accommodations to Na-
tive Americans in national parks, under the legislative discretion doctrine, it
could likely be justified on the grounds that the effect of such tourism con-
stitutes an exceptional burden on the Native Americans seeking to engage
in religious practices.55
2. Entrance Fee
Another potential burden arising out of the government creating a na-
tional park on land sacred to Native Americans is an entrance fee. Many
national parks require visitors to pay a fee to enter for a certain amount of
time.56 There can be no doubt that this burden is government-created, but
does it rise to the level of an exceptional burden?
The financial burden imposed by the park entrance fee is comparable
to the penalty at issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. In that case,
the plaintiff, Hobby Lobby, argued that the Affordable Care Act’s contra-
ceptive mandate, which required certain employers to provide insurance to
cover preventative care, substantially burdened their religious exercise.57
The employer could choose not to comply with the contraceptive mandate,
but it would be subject to a fine of $100 a day per affected individual.58 The
Supreme Court of the United States agreed with Hobby Lobby, finding that
the contraceptive mandate created a scenario where Hobby Lobby was
54. See Berg, supra note 3, at 103–51; McConnell, supra note 2, at 685–742.
55. Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lyng provides another view to this analysis. Justice Brennan
stated that there is no significant distinction between “government[ ] actions that compel affirma-
tive conduct inconsistent with religious belief, and those governmental actions that prevent con-
duct consistent with religious belief.” Lyng, 485 U.S. at 468. Furthermore, Justice Brennan stated
that “religious freedom is threatened no less by governmental action that makes the practice of
one’s chosen faith impossible than by governmental programs that pressure one to engage in
conduct inconsistent with religious beliefs.” Id. Brennan’s dissent in Lyng is less concerned with
how religious practices are harmed, and instead more focused on the extent of harm. Applying
Brennan’s arguments to this situation’s noise and privacy concerns associated with increased tour-
ism could be considered a burden. If certain Native American religious practices require an undis-
turbed natural setting in order to be effective, and increased tourism disrupts the natural setting,
then it appears that the government will have created a situation where the Native Americans are
prevented from practicing their religious rituals. Accordingly, under Brennan’s analysis, increased
tourism could be a substantial burden.
56. Plan Your Visit, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/planyourvisit/passes.htm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2019).
57. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014); see also Brief for Respondents
at 9, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
58. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762.
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forced to “engage in conduct that seriously violate[d] their religious beliefs”
or suffer severe economic consequences.59 To the Supreme Court, this was
a substantial burden.
One of the propositions Hobby Lobby stands for is that requiring one
to pay a substantial fee simply to act in accordance with one’s religious
beliefs creates a substantial burden.60 Other courts have supported this read-
ing as well.61 If the government did not provide accommodations (in the
form of eliminating the entrance fee) to Native Americans in a scenario
where the government designates sacred land as a national park, the Native
Americans would be required to pay the park entrance fee in order to prac-
tice their religious rituals in the park. Should the Native Americans refuse
to pay the fee, they would be denied access to the park, and consequently be
deprived of an opportunity to exercise their religion on site-specific sacred
ground. Thus, applying the reasoning of Hobby Lobby, the government-
imposed fee to enter a national park to engage in religious practices would
impose an exceptional burden on Native Americans.
Certain distinctions can be made between the fee in Hobby Lobby and
a park entrance fee to a national park. Opponents of accommodation will
point out that in Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff was required to pay a fine or
take affirmative steps that violated their religious beliefs. In the context of a
national park, however, the consequence of not paying the entrance fee
would not result in Native Americans being coerced into affirmatively act-
ing against their beliefs. The Native Americans would instead be prevented
from engaging in religious acts. Thus, the outcomes in avoiding the fee are
different.
However, this is not a material distinction. While the fee-avoiding out-
come may be different in a national park scenario than it is in Hobby Lobby,
the analysis is only focused on the fee-paying outcome. With regard to the
fee-paying outcome, the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby recognized that
paying a fee to act in accordance with one’s religion is a substantial burden
on one’s religious exercise. This concept applies perfectly well to the na-
tional park context; the Native Americans must pay a fee in order to act in
accordance with their religion. Under Hobby Lobby analysis, this is an ex-
59. Id. at 2775.
60. Id. at 2759 (“If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be
facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy price—as much as
$1.3 million per day, or about $475 million per year, in the case of one of the companies. If these
consequences do not amount to a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would.”).
61. See generally Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 16
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The ‘substantial burden’ in this case comes from the large monetary penalty
imposed on religious organizations that choose not to submit the required form.”); Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2775–76, 2779. It is settled that a direct monetary penalty on the exercise of religion
constitutes a “substantial burden.”); id. (penalty for not providing contraceptive coverage); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (fine for not sending children to high school); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (describing hypothetical fine for Saturday worship).
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ceptional burden because the Native Americans are coerced against practic-
ing their religion.62
Opponents will also point out that the fees are very different between
the two scenarios. In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff would be forced to pay
$1.3 million per day.63 For entrance into a national park, the fee would be
substantially less.64 However, comparing the funds available to a large cor-
poration to the funds available to an individual is not appropriate.65 A more
apt comparison would be comparing Native American religious observers
to members of other religions. Most religious adherents do not need to pay
the government a fee solely to attend their place of worship. Native Ameri-
cans entering a national park to access sacred land, with no accommodation
present, would have to pay an amount each time they wanted to worship. In
light of this, the entrance fee certainly appears exceptional.
3. Restricted Access to Certain Areas
Restrictions on accessing certain sites represent a third possible burden
to Native Americans created by the government’s designation of sacred
land as a national park. Many national parks limit activities in or access to
certain areas of the park. For example, federal regulations allow park super-
intendents to “restrict hiking or pedestrian use to a designated trail or walk-
way system,” which could effectively cut off access to Native American
spiritual sites.66 These same regulations also prohibit “[w]alking on, climb-
ing, entering, ascending, descending, or traversing an archeological or cul-
62. Also, Lyng indicates that a government action is unconstitutional if an individual is “co-
erced by the Government’s action into violating their religious beliefs[.]” Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. If
Native American religious beliefs require them to enter sacred land within a national park, there is
an issue under Lyng, as well.
63. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
64. For example, a seven-day pass to Grand Canyon National Park is thirty-five dollars. See
How Much Does the Grand Canyon Cost?, MYGRANDCANYONPARK.COM, http://www.mygrand
canyonpark.com/fees/ (last visited July 1, 2018). The Yellowstone National Park entrance fee is
fifteen dollars for an individual. See Entrance Fees, YELLOWSTONE, http://yellowstone.net/intro/
introduction-to-yellowstone/entrance-fees/ (last visited July 1, 2018).
65. In its 2017 fiscal year, Hobby Lobby had revenue of $4.6 billion. America’s Largest
Private Companies, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/largest-private-companies/list/2/#tab:rank
(last visited Jan. 21, 2019). In contrast, the median household income for single-race American
Indians and Alaska Natives in 2016 was $39,719. American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage
Month: November 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/
facts-for-features/2017/aian-month.html. While revenue is not a perfect metric for determining
available funds, it does provide context as to how the meaning of the term “substantial” could vary
between an individual and a large corporation.
66. 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(b) (2017). These regulations also prohibit “the taking, use, or possession
of fish, wildlife, or plants for ceremonial or religious purposes, except for the gathering and re-
moval of plants or plant parts by enrolled members of an Indian tribe” in certain circumstances. 36
C.F.R. § 2.1(d) (2017). As such national park rules could prevent Native Americans from partici-
pating in religious ceremonies that require the taking of wildlife or plants in a manner inconsistent
with the regulations.
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tural resource, monument, or statue” except under certain conditions.67
Violations of these rules often result in fines, and in some cases,
imprisonment.68
Many Native American religions have close ties to archeological and
cultural sites, and federal regulations allow park superintendents to limit or
restrict access and activities on these sites. It is possible that absent accom-
modation, Native Americans could be denied access to sites containing re-
ligious significance. Alternatively, even if permitted access to such
religious sites, it is possible that the Native Americans could be prohibited
from engaging in religious practices at those sites due to regulations. Con-
sequently, it could be argued that such government-created rules burden
Native American religious exercise, which occurs when a government act
coerces an individual into violating their religious beliefs.69 To this end, the
case of Sherbert v. Verner is informative.70
In Sherbert v. Verner, an employee of a textile mill refused to work on
Saturdays as that was the day of her religion’s Sabbath.71 The woman was
fired from her job and could not find other employment due to her refusal to
work on Saturdays. The state of South Carolina refused to provide the wo-
man with unemployment benefits on the grounds that her refusal to work on
Saturdays did not constitute “good cause.”72
The Supreme Court of the United States held that South Carolina could
not withhold unemployment benefits from the woman, as doing so consti-
tuted a burden on her religious exercise. The Court said that
[t]he ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and aban-
doning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work,
on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts
the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship.73
Government action prohibiting Native Americans from accessing spiri-
tual sites within a national park would be even more egregious than the
state’s refusal to give unemployment benefits in Sherbert. Unlike the wo-
man in Sherbert, the Native Americans would not be deprived of a benefit
if they practiced their beliefs, but rather would be punished likely through a
fine or imprisonment if they attempted to practice their religious rituals by
accessing restricted areas. Without accommodation, the Native Americans
67. 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(5) (2017).
68. 36 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2017).
69. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
70. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
71. Id. at 401.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 404.
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would be forced to choose between following the precepts of their religion
and being fined or imprisoned, or abandoning one of the precepts of their
religion in order to avoid a fine or imprisonment. Subjecting Native Ameri-
cans to restrictions on accessing archeological sites that hold religious sig-
nificance would be a burden on their religious exercise.
One could distinguish the facts of Sherbert from Native Americans
seeking religious practice in a restricted area of a national park, the argu-
ment being that Native Americans could avoid breaking the rules and being
fined by practicing their religion elsewhere, such as in another environment
with similar qualities. The unemployed woman in Sherbert, on the other
hand, had no option of moving her Sabbath to a different day. Thus, under
this view, the Native Americans have alternatives in their spiritual practice,
while the woman in Sherbert did not.
In many contexts, however, this counterargument will likely fail. Na-
tive American religious beliefs often attach religious importance to specific
areas.74 Finding a similar area of land simply will not work because the
substituted land will not hold any religious significance. Justice Brennan’s
dissent in Lyng, which was quoted previously, perfectly explains this
concept:
Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land.
The site-specific nature of Indian religious practice derives from
the Native American perception that land is itself a sacred, living
being . . . . Rituals are performed in prescribed locations not
merely as a matter of traditional orthodoxy, but because land, like
all other living things, is unique, and specific sites possess differ-
ent spiritual properties and significance. Within this belief sys-
tem, therefore, land is not fungible[.]75
Accordingly, Native Americans who are prohibited from accessing
spiritual sites due to park regulations really have no other option when it
comes to their method of worship. This would effectively put the Native
Americans in the same situation as the unemployed woman in Sherbert,
meaning the burden would likely rise to the level of “exceptional.”
A further counterargument could be made that, while Sherbert is rele-
vant to analyzing the issue of restricted access, the cases of Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Authority and Badoni v. Higginson are even more rele-
vant.76 In these cases, the courts determined that the government action of
flooding land that held significance to Native Americans was not a violation
of the Native Americans’ Free Exercise rights.77 Accommodation oppo-
nents could argue that the act of flooding sites significant to Native Ameri-
74. Brady, supra note 6; Carpenter, supra note 6.
75. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 460–61.
76. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Badoni v. Higgin-
son, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
77. See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
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cans effectively restricts Native American access to such sites, and thus
these two cases support the proposition that restricting access to sites is
acceptable.
However, these cases do not stand for the proposition that such restric-
tions never constitute an exceptional burden. In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Val-
ley Authority, the plaintiff Cherokee Native Americans claimed that the
proposed flooding of sacred land would deny the Cherokee of their right to
freely exercise their religion.78 The Sixth Circuit ultimately found that the
harm claimed by the Cherokee was “damage to tribal and family folklore
and traditions, more than particular religious observances[.]”79 Because
there was no religious burden, the Sixth Circuit ruled that there was no
harm to an interest protected by the Free Exercise clause.80
In Badoni v. Higginson, the plaintiff Navajo Native Americans as-
serted that the government’s action of flooding a sacred site infringed on
their Free Exercise right because the flooding denied the Navajo access to a
prayer spot.81 Like the Sixth Circuit in Sequoyah, the Tenth Circuit found in
favor of the government. However, the Tenth Circuit did not assess the
extent of the Navajo’s burdens. Rather, the court’s analysis examined the
government’s interest. The court stated:
In the instant case unrebutted evidence, by affidavit, shows that
the storage capacity of the lake would be cut in half if the surface
level were dropped to an elevation necessary to alleviate the com-
plained of infringements. The required reduction would signifi-
cantly reduce the water available to the Upper Basin States of
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming from the Colorado
River.82
The court found this government interest to be compelling, and as
such, decided not to assess “the question whether the government action
involved infringes plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion.”83
In addition to the lack of relevant analysis provided by the Sixth Cir-
cuit and the Tenth Circuit in Sequoyah and Badoni, the facts surrounding
the restricted access in those cases are materially distinct from the restricted
access scenario laid out in this article. The restricted access in Sequoyah
and Badoni resulted from the government flooding the sacred land. This
article examines restricted access resulting from park regulations enforced
through fines and imprisonment. This distinction is important because a
78. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163.
79. Id. at 1164.
80. Id. at 1165.
81. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177 (“With respect to the government action of impounding water in
Lake Powell the stated infringement is the drowning of the Navajo gods, the increased tourist
presence attributable to the level at which the lake is kept, and the denial of access to the prayer
spot now under water.”).
82. Id. at 177.
83. Id. at 177 n.4.
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government action that merely makes religious practice more difficult does
not constitute a substantial burden. Rather, a substantial burden occurs
when the government coerces an individual into violating their religious
beliefs.84 Flooding sacred land would clearly make religious exercise more
difficult. However, the act of flooding would not involve coercion. Restrict-
ing access through fines and imprisonment, on the other hand, would in-
volve coercion, as the Native Americans could be subject to penalties for
engaging in religious practices.
In this regard, the case of Crow v. Gullet is more helpful.85 In Crow,
the government was in the process of constructing roads, bridges, parking
lots, and facilities in Bear Butte State Park.86 Bear Butte State Park contains
Bear Butte, a geological formation used by the Lakota Nation and the Tsist-
sistas Nation for important religious ceremonies.87 Due to the construction,
the government prohibited overnight camping in the area traditionally used
by the Lakota and the Tsistsistas for religious ceremonies.88 The Lakota and
the Tsistsistas were still allowed to use the sacred land during the
daytime.89
Certain members of the Lakota Nation and the Tsistsistas Nation
brought suit, claiming that, among other things, the restricted access to the
ceremonial site violated their Free Exercise rights.90 In finding in favor of
the government on the issue of restricted access, the fact that the restrictions
were temporary and partial played an important role in the court’s analysis:
Although plaintiffs have concluded that their right of access was
unduly restricted, the record fails to show that a single person was
ever denied access to Bear Butte for religious purposes. Defend-
ants closed the ceremonial area temporarily and partially, in the
interests of protecting the safety of the public and assuring the
most expedient completion of construction. . .any right of access
possessed by plaintiffs is restricted only partially and temporarily.
Plaintiffs failed to establish that overnight camping at the ceremo-
nial area is an indispensible part of their religious practices. Con-
versely, defendants met their burden of demonstrating that the
State has a compelling interest in completing the construction
projects[.]91
84. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
85. Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
86. Id. at 787–88.
87. Id. at 787.
88. Id. at 789–90.
89. Id. at 790.
90. Id. at 788.
91. Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792. The court also mentions the Sequoyah and Badoni cases in its
analysis, stating that those courts “held that Native Americans’ right to free exercise of religion
was not unduly burdened even though their access to sacred ceremonial sites was completely
barred by the permanent flooding of the sites for dam and reservoir projects.” Id. However, as
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Under the Crow court’s analysis, a partial and temporary restriction on
accessing a religious site would likely not rise to the level of an exceptional
burden. However, the court’s emphasis on the partial and temporary nature
of the restrictions suggests that a more permanent or total restriction would
constitute a heavy enough burden. In such a case, an outright prohibition on
accessing a religious site could very well rise to the level of an exceptional
burden.
In summary, there are several government-created burdens that could
potentially rise to the level of exceptional, including tourism, entrance fees,
and restrictions on accessing certain areas within a park. At this point, the
analysis now shifts to examining whether the accommodations relieve the
religious adherents of these burdens. Can the identified government-created
burdens be relieved by admitting Native Americans into the park without a
fee, permitting Native Americans to access restricted areas of the park, and
allowing Native Americans to access the park for religious purposes, even
when it is closed?
The answer to this question is clearly yes. First, the removal of the
entrance fee would eradicate the state imposed financial burden on the Na-
tive Americans’ religious exercise. Second, eliminating restrictions on ac-
cessing cultural or archeological sites would allow Native Americans to
reach religiously significant sites, while also increasing the privacy availa-
ble, as other park visitors attending for non-religious purposes would not be
allowed to approach those areas. Finally, allowing Native American relig-
ious adherents to enter the park during hours when the park is closed would
provide even more opportunities for privacy. Consequently, each of these
accommodations would alleviate the Native Americans of the burdens cre-
ated by the government.
B. Burdens Imposed on Third Parties
The second prong of Cutter requires that one “must take adequate ac-
count of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries[.]”92 When examining the harm to third parties, there are
two different factors that should be taken into account: the magnitude of
third-party harm, and the likelihood of third-party harm.93 The magnitude of
third-party harm takes into account how seriously injured the third party
is.94 The likelihood of harm examines the probability of the harm actually
occurring.95
discussed previously, neither the Sequoyah nor the Badoni decision actually analyzed the extent to
which the plaintiff Native Americans’ religious rights were burdened.
92. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
93. Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment
Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1377–79 (2016).
94. Id. at 1377.
95. Id. at 1378.
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Under this analysis, the focus of this section will shift towards the
harm caused to third parties if the religious accommodations in the previous
section were granted to Native Americans. Put differently, how would third
parties be affected if Native Americans were exempt from entrance fees,
rules restricting access to certain areas of the park, and could enter the park
when closed? Additionally, a complete restriction on rock climbing during
Native American religious rituals will be examined, as this issue has been
raised in past cases. Under this framework, possible third-party burdens in-
clude the fact that non-Native American visitors will be subject to higher
entrance fees, non-Native American visitors will be deprived of the full
experience of archeological and cultural sites, and the ban on rock climbing
for a certain periods of time.
1. Higher Entrance Fees for Visitors
One possible third-party burden is higher entrance fees. The theory
behind this burden is that national parks need to raise money in order to
offset the cost of maintenance and repair to roads, trails, and buildings, as
well as administrative costs (law enforcement, etc.) and visitor centers. The
parks raise a portion of these revenues through charging visitors an entrance
fee.96 By eliminating park entrance fees for Native Americans through ac-
commodation, more of the maintenance and repair costs will shift onto the
non-Native American visitors. Essentially, non-Native American visitors
are paying the costs of the Native Americans’ religious exercise.
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Supreme Court of the United
States examined a Texas statute that exempted religious periodicals “con-
sisting entirely of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith” from the
state’s sales tax.97 The Supreme Court held that Texas’ tax exemption vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. In particular, the Supreme Court noted that
the statute “burden[ed] nonbeneficiaries by increasing their tax bills by
whatever amount is needed to offset the benefit bestowed on subscribers to
religious publications. The fact that such exemptions are of long standing
cannot shield them from the structures of the Establishment Clause.”98
The Texas Monthly majority also distinguished the case from Zorach v.
Clausen. In Zorach, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it was
constitutional for New York City to allow its public schools to release stu-
dents during the school day so the students could “go to religious centers
96. See Kevin Freking, U.S. Raises Entrance Fees for Some National Parks, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/u-s-raises-entrance-fees-national-parks/;
Kurt Repanshek, Entrance Fees Generate Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Year for National
Park Service, NAT’L PARKS TRAVELER (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/
2010/02/entrance-fees-generate-hundreds-millions-dollars-year-national-park-service5360.
97. Bullock, 489 U.S. at 5.
98. Id. at 18 n.8.
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for religious instruction or devotional exercises.”99 The Supreme Court, in
Texas Monthly, noted that New York City’s “resealed time program” in
Zorach was distinct from Texas’ tax law because it did not “impose mone-
tary costs on their parents or other taxpayers who opposed, or were indiffer-
ent to, the religious instruction given to students who were released.”100
Thus, the relevant takeaway from the Texas Monthly decision is that if
an accommodation places a greater financial strain on third parties, a third-
party burden has occurred that must be considered in the weighing pro-
cess.101 But surely there must be a limit to the financial burden on third
parties. Does an accommodation impose a harm onto third parties if the
financial burden on the nonbeneficiaries amounts to mere pennies?
Courts seem to draw the line at “de minimis costs.” In Kong v. Min De
Parle, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
examined whether a section of the Balanced Budget Act burdened third
parties by imposing a higher tax burden on those third parties.102 The Dis-
trict Court stated that “[e]ven if treatment in a RNHCI were more expen-
sive, however, the effect on the individual taxpayer would be de-
minimis. . . . [r]eligious accommodations are not unconstitutional merely
because they place a slight cost on others.”103 The de minimis standard has
also been used in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.104
Accordingly, accommodations that place more than a de minimis fi-
nancial expense on nonbeneficiaries are often treated as a third-party burden
that must be weighed against the religious adherent’s burden.105 For pur-
poses of Cutter’s second prong and the subsequent weighing of burdens, it
must be determined whether or not the increase in entrance fees for non-
Native American park visitors is merely de minimis.
While there is no data that conclusively states the number of Native
Americans visiting national parks to engage in religious practices, research
suggests that the percent of Native American visitors to national parks is
approximately equal to the percent of the general U.S. population that is
99. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952).
100. Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
101. Id. (“Texas’ tax exemption, by contrast, does not remove a demonstrated and possibly
grave imposition on religious activity sheltered by the Free Exercise Clause. Moreover, it burdens
nonbeneficiaries by increasing their tax bills by whatever amount is needed to offset the benefit
bestowed on subscribers to religious publications.”).
102. Kong v. Min De Parle, No. 00-4285, 2001 WL 1464549, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2001).
103. Id. at *8.
104. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To require TWA to bear
more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”)
(emphasis added).
105. The fact that a financial expense imposed upon a third party is considered more than de
minimis does not automatically invalidate the accommodation. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339 (relig-
ious accommodation declared constitutional even though third party suffered burden of losing his
job). Rather, the expense is a factor to be considered in weighing the first and second prongs of
Cutter.
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Native American, or two percent.106 The National Park Service stated that
entrance fees collected in 2016 totaled $199 million.107 Using the 2016 en-
trance fees and the assumption that Native American religious adherents
represent two percent of park visitors, exempting Native Americans from
park entrance fees would mean the National Park Service would need to, in
total, charge an additional $4 million108 to non-Native American visitors.109
Whether this amount rises above the level of de minimis to a burden is
debatable.110
Opponents to accommodation may point out that it appears inconsis-
tent to argue that third parties bearing the Native American’s entrance ex-
pense is not a harm to third parties, while also arguing that the entrance fee
is a substantial burden to Native Americans. If the exceptional burden on
Native Americans as a group were $4 million a year in entrance fees, then
why is this not a burden on third parties, as well? The issue with this rea-
soning is that courts tend to approach fees from the perspective of the indi-
vidual.111 Consequently, costs should not be viewed in the aggregate, but
rather by its cost per affected constituent. When the size of the populations
being compared (Native Americans engaging in religious practice in a na-
106. In a 2009 study conducted by the National Park Service, where “landline and cellular
phone numbers were randomly sampled, American Indians/Alaska Natives were represented
among recent visitors in roughly the same proportions as their fractions of the sample as a whole.”
National Park Service Comprehensive Survey of the American Public, NAT’L PARK SERV. (July
2011), https://www.nature.nps.gov/socialscience/docs/CompSurvey2008_2009RaceEthnicity.pdf.
Others suggest Native Americans are underrepresented in park visitors. Tik Root, Meet the People
Behind a Movement to Diversify Our National Parks, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 1, 2017), https://
news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/02/diversity-in-national-parks/. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, the American Indians and Alaska Natives population totaled 5.4 million in 2015, or two
percent of the U.S. population. American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November
2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/news
room/facts-for-features/2015/cb15-ff22_AIAN_month.pdf. https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2015/cb15-ff22_AIAN_month.pdf.
107. National Park Service Announces Plan to Address Infrastructure Needs & Improve Visi-
tor Experience, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1207/04-12-2018-
entrance-fees.htm.
108. Two percent of $199 million is $3.98 million.
109. As of April 2018, there is “$11.6 billion in deferred maintenance across the system of
417 parks, historic and cultural sites, and monuments.” NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 107. Con-
sequently, it is unlikely that the National Park Service would simply forgo the lost revenue in the
event that Native Americans are exempt from entrance fees.
110. The National Park had 330,882,751 recreation visits in 2017, and 330,971,689 recreation
visits in 2016. National Park System Sees More Than 330 Million Visits, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Feb.
28, 2018), https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1207/02-28-2018-visitation-certified.htm. However, of the
National Park Service’s 417 parks, historic and cultural sites, and monuments, only 117 charge
entrance fees. This, along with the fact that entrance fees vary by visitor type and other circum-
stances, makes nearly impossible to know how this $4 million shortfall would be distributed. The
analysis is not as simple as spreading $4 million over 331 million visitors.
111. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208 (parents fined for not sending children to high school); Sher-
bert, 374 U.S. at 404 (withholding unemployment benefits “puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”).
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tional park against visitors there for non-religious reasons) is vastly differ-
ent, the severity of the burden will also vary between the groups.
Supporters of accommodation will highlight the fact that not all of a
national park’s maintenance costs are covered by entrance fees; Congress
provides the parks with significant funding as well.112 Thus, it cannot be
said that all of the Native Americans’ costs must be covered by non-Native
American visitors, thereby weakening the claim that third parties are bur-
dened. However, this reasoning is also flawed because it ignores the fact
that third parties include not only non-Native American visitors to a na-
tional park, but also taxpayers in general.113 In order for Congress to obtain
money to fund the national parks’ maintenance costs, they must raise the
funding from taxpayers. Accordingly, by allowing Native Americans to not
contribute to maintenance fees, taxpayers in general could be paying for the
costs.
Despite this, expanding the population left paying the maintenance
costs may work in the Native Americans’ favor. There is a better argument
that costs are de minimis if those costs are spread out over a larger group of
people. As mentioned previously, the way to approach these issues is to
look at it from the perspective of the individual.114 By increasing the popu-
lation bearing the burden, the total cost remains the same, but the cost per
person will decrease.
Overall, it is difficult to say whether or not such an increase in en-
trance fees would constitute more than a de minimis cost without knowing
how the new costs would be allocated. The smaller the population the $4
million is obtained from, the more likely it is that the cost will be excep-
tional. On the other hand, the larger the population that the $4 million is
obtained from, the more likely it is to be de minimis. To enrich the analysis
of this article, the increase in entrance fees will be examined as if it were a
burden.
2. Restricted Access to Cultural and Archeological Sites
Another injury third parties may argue is that they are being deprived
of experiencing the archeological sites that Native Americans consider sa-
cred. However, bans on accessing the archeological sites are in place to
112. See National Parks Maintenance Backlog Reaches $11.9 Billion, NAT’L PARK SERV.
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/news/release.htm?id=1780; National Parks Have a
Long To-Do List but Can’t Cover the Repair Costs, NPR (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.npr.org/
2016/03/08/466461595/national-parks-have-a-long-to-do-list-but-cant-cover-the-repair-costs.
113. See Bullock, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (“Texas’ tax exemption. . .burdens nonbeneficiaries by
increasing their tax bills by whatever amount is needed to offset the benefit bestowed on subscrib-
ers to religious publications.”).
114. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208 (parents fined for not sending children to high school); Sher-
bert, 374 U.S. at 404 (withholding unemployment benefits “puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”).
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preserve the sites and prevent destruction and tampering.115 Depriving visi-
tors of fully accessing these sites is the very purpose of the policy. Further-
more, it is well within the authority of park superintendents to issue such
restrictions.116 Any argument of a third-party burden here is essentially in
the same vein as the argument that all accommodations are unconstitutional.
However, courts have rejected this argument.117 Therefore, this would not
rise to the level of a burden to third parties.
3. Rock Climbing Restrictions During Native American Religious
Ceremonies
One religious accommodation on public land that has been sought by
Native Americans in the past is a ban on rock climbing during times of
religious significance for Native Americans.118 Because this issue could
arise again in the future, this subsection will examine the harm caused to
third parties if the federal government were to temporarily ban rocking
climbing in a national park in order to accommodate Native American relig-
ious rituals.
The most well-known case regarding this issue is Bear Lodge v. Bab-
bitt, which dealt with a dispute over Devils Tower, a national monument in
Wyoming.119 Devils Tower is considered sacred to the local Native Ameri-
cans, and the Native Americans practice many religious activities there, in-
cluding Sun Dances and Vision Quests.120 However, Devils Tower is also a
popular destination for rock climbing, which some Native Americans have
complained “adversely impacted their traditional activities and seriously
impaired the spiritual quality of the site.”121
To address the Native Americans’ concerns, the National Park Service
prepared a climbing management plan that, among other things, asked that
rock climbers “voluntarily refrain from climbing on Devils Tower during
the culturally significant month of June.”122 If the voluntary June closure
115. 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(6) (2017).
116. 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(b) (2017).
117. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334.
118. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999); Mindy
Sink, Religion and Recreation Clash at Park, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 1996), http://www.nytimes
.com/1996/07/01/us/religion-and-recreation-clash-at-park.html; Ryan Slattery, Climbing Banned
at Sacred Washoe Site, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 30, 2003), https://indiancountrymedianet
work.com/news/climbing-banned-at-sacred-washoe-site/.
119. Babbitt, 175 F.3d at 818.
120. Id. at 817 (“Devils Tower is ‘vital to the health of our nation and to our self-determina-
tion as a Tribe. Those who use the butte to pray become stronger. They gain sacred knowledge
from the spirits that helps us to preserve our Lakota culture and way of life. They become leaders.
Without their knowledge and leadership, we cannot continue to determine our destiny.’”).
121. Id. at 818.
122. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
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turned out to be unsuccessful, the National Park Service would consider
mandatory closure of rock climbing in June.123
A group of local climbers claimed the climbing management plan vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. Although the climbers in the lawsuit admit-
ted that they had climbed during the month of June, they argued other
climbers had been “coerced by the ban into refraining from climbing.”124
The Tenth Circuit determined that the climbers had suffered no harm,
and therefore did not have standing to sue.125 In addressing the alleged “co-
ercion” that the parties who refrained from climbing in June suffered, the
court stated, “[e]ven if other Bear Lodge members have elected not to climb
in June, that decision is one of several choices available under the plan and
is not an injury conferring standing.”126 Finally, the court determined that
the risk of mandatory June closure is not an actual harm:
As the district court held, the possibility of mandatory closure is a
“remote and speculative possibility,” and is just one of many pos-
sibilities FCMP will consider if the present plan proves unsuc-
cessful. The Climbers’ fear of an outright climbing ban in June
does not satisfy the constitutional requirement for an injury in
fact, which must be “actual or imminent not conjectural or
hypothetical.”127
Thus, the rule that came out of the Bear Lodge decision is that a third
party has not suffered actual harm if a government policy merely encour-
ages, but does not require, refraining from rock climbing in order to respect
Native American rituals. However, the decision also suggests that if the
government were to actually temporarily ban rock climbing activity, that
restriction could be a harm to third parties. While a ban on rock climbing is
not one of the accommodations suggested by this article, it is worth noting
that if such an accommodation were given, it would likely be a burden to
third parties to be considered in the weighing process. Those drafting ac-
commodations must be aware that rock climbing restrictions could make an
accommodation unconstitutional under the Cutter test.
123. Id. at 820 (“If NPS determines that voluntary June closure and the educational programs
have not been successful, it will consider several actions, including, but not limited to: (a) revise
the climbing management plan; (b) reconvene a climbing management plan work group; (c) insti-
tute additional measures to further encourage compliance; (d) change the duration and nature of
the voluntary closure; (e) convert the June closure to mandatory; (f) write a new definition of
success for the voluntary closure.”).
124. Id. at 821.
125. Babbitt, 175 F.3d at 821 (“The named individual recreational climbers whose climbing
activities have been undeterred by the FCMP have established no injury in fact and therefore do
not have standing.”).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 821–22.
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C. The Balancing Test
Once the third-party burdens that would be imposed by the accommo-
dation have been identified, a balancing test must be performed, whereby
the Native Americans’ burdens absent the accommodation need be com-
pared against the third parties’ burdens caused by the accommodation. If
the third-party burdens are not clearly disproportionate to the Native Ameri-
can burdens, the accommodation will have passed the balancing test, and
the analysis will then shift to Cutter’s third prong, determining if the ac-
commodation is denominationally neutral.
The possible government-created burdens that Native Americans could
experience absent accommodation include reduced privacy when con-
ducting religious ritual, paying a fee to access religiously significant sites,
and restricted access to religiously significant sites. The potential burdens
suffered by third parties with accommodation include the potential of
slightly higher entrance fees.
When these two sets of burdens are weighed, it is clear that the Native
American burdens absent accommodation outweigh the third-party burdens
with accommodations. Native Americans stand to suffer the financial bur-
den of paying the government a fee to enter the park to access spiritual
sites. Third parties also may suffer financially, because exempting Native
Americans from entrance fees could cause national parks to raise their rates
to offset the decrease in park passes sold. While the third-party harms end
here, the Native Americans’ burdens do not. Native Americans also must
endure decreased privacy during religious rituals, and could be prohibited
from accessing sites of religious significance. The third parties, on the other
hand, suffer no religious restrictions. Thus, given that Native Americans
could endure all of the burdens suffered by the third parties and then some,
it is clear that the scale tips in favor of the Native Americans when weigh-
ing these burdens.
D. Denominational Neutrality
Cutter’s third and final prong necessitates that accommodations “be
administered neutrally among different faiths[.]”128 The case of Board of
Education, Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet fleshed out the
concept of denominational neutrality.129 In Kiryas Joel, the New York Leg-
islature passed a law that purposefully drew the lines of a school district to
match the boundary of Kiryas Joel, a village whose population was com-
prised entirely of adherents to Satmar Hasidim.130 In passing this law, the
legislature ignored customary practice in creating school districts. The end
result of drawing the school district’s boundary in this manner was to create
128. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
129. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. 687.
130. Id. at 693.
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a school district composed entirely of people of the same religion. In exam-
ining this issue, the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
[b]ecause the district’s creation ran uniquely counter to state prac-
tice, following the lines of a religious community where the cus-
tomary and neutral principles would not have dictated the same
result, we have good reasons to treat this district as the reflection
of a religious criterion for identifying the recipients of civil
authority.131
Furthermore, “Kiryas Joel did not receive its new governmental au-
thority simply as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment
under a general law[.]”132 The Supreme Court declared the law unconstitu-
tional, as it failed the neutrality requirement by “singl[ing] out a particular
religious sect for special treatment[.]”133
The Supreme Court distinguished between other cases in which de-
nominational neutrality was present:
[i]n Walz . . ., for example, the Court sustained a property tax
exemption for religious properties in part because the State had
“not singled out one particular church or religious group or even
churches as such,” but had exempted “a broad class of property
owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations.” . . . And Bowen
. . . upheld a statute enlisting a “wide spectrum of organizations”
in addressing adolescent sexuality because the law was “neutral
with respect to the grantee’s status as a sectarian or purely secular
institution.” . . . Here the benefit flows only to a single sect, but
aiding this single, small religious group causes no less a constitu-
tional problem than would follow from aiding a sect with more
members or religion as a whole[.]134
Accordingly, the Kiryas Joel case stands for the proposition that a law
is not denominationally neutral when it singles out a particular religion. If
the government were to provide religious accommodations to Native Amer-
icans visiting national parks, it would need to make sure to follow this rule.
This would mean that the law creating the accommodations must avoid pro-
viding those accommodations only to Native American religions, both
facially and substantively.
In order to be facially neutral, the law would need to abstain from
using words explicitly singling out Native American religions. Words that
make the accommodation available to all religions with religious ties to the
particular land would likely achieve facial neutrality. In addition to facial
neutrality, the law would also need to be substantively neutral. Substantive
neutrality focuses on the practical effect of the law, as opposed to the actual
131. Id. at 702.
132. Id. at 703.
133. Id. at 706.
134. Id. at 704–05.
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words used in the law.135 An accommodation would lack substantive neu-
trality if the effect of the government action is to single out a particular
religious sect for special treatment. Applied to Native Americans seeking
religious accommodations in a national park, the law providing such ac-
commodations would need to effectively accommodate other religions that
believe the land in national parks holds religious value. For example,
Wicca, Neo-druidism, and the Goddess movement all have close ties to
nature, and would likely also need to be covered under the accommodation,
in order to achieve denominational neutrality.
One may argue that there is no one Native American religion; there are
many types of Native American religions, each with its own diverse set of
beliefs. Consequently, an accommodation applying only to Native Ameri-
can religions is not “singl[ing] out a particular religious sect for special
treatment[.]”136 However, while this may be true in theory, this argument
would likely fail, as courts tend to treat Native American religions as a
single religious entity.137 Accordingly, singling out Native American reli-
gions for protection would likely violate denominational neutrality.
In summary, any law providing accommodations to Native Americans
seeking to engage in religious exercises in a national park would need to be
denominationally neutral. This would entail making sure that the law is
both neutral on its face, as well as neutral in substance. In application, this
would mean ensuring that the text of the accommodation law does not ex-
plicitly single out Native Americans, and that the law is also written in a
manner so that the accommodations would extend to other religions with
religious ties to sites within national parks. While a definitive conclusion as
to this prong cannot be determined until such an accommodation law is
actually drafted, there are feasible means through which the law could be
drafted that would satisfy the denominational neutrality prong.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accommodations should be available to Native Americans seeking to
perform religious exercises in a national park. These accommodations
should include allowing Native Americans to enter the park for free, per-
mitting Native Americans to access restricted areas of the park, and author-
izing Native Americans to enter the park for religious purposes, even when
it is closed.
135. “Such standard-like substantive neutrality extends beyond the words of a statute, or the
intent of the legislature, and encompasses the effect of legislation on religious people.” Lisa W.
Hanks, Justice Souter: Defining “Substantive Neutrality” in an Age of Religious Politics, 48
STAN. L. REV. 903, 922 (1996).
136. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 706.
137. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he Forest Service commissioned a study of American
Indian cultural and religious sites in the area.”) (emphasis added); Bowen, 476 U.S. 695 (“Appel-
lees contended that obtaining a Social Security number for their 2-year-old daughter, Little Bird of
the Snow, would violate their Native American religious beliefs.”) (emphasis added).
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Because these proposed accommodations would take place through a
legislative action, the relevant governing case is Cutter v. Wilkinson,
wherein the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the accommo-
dations provided by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act. In Cutter, the Supreme Court stated that a statutory religious accom-
modation is constitutional if the accommodation (1) alleviates an excep-
tional government-created burden on religious exercise, (2) takes adequate
account for the accommodation’s burden on third parties, and (3) is denom-
inationally neutral.138
Consistent with the standard set forth in Cutter, this article examined
the Native American religious accommodations using the three-pronged ap-
proach. Under the first prong, the harms suffered by Native Americans ab-
sent accommodations include reduced privacy when conducting religious
ritual, paying a fee to access religiously significant sites, and restricted ac-
cess to religiously significant sites. With respect to the second prong, third
parties may suffer from paying higher entrance fees if the accommodations
were granted. When the burdens of the first two prongs are weighed against
each other, it is clear the Native Americans’ burdens outweigh the third-
party burdens. Regarding the third prong, there is a clear path to passing
Cutter’s denominational neutrality requirement: the accommodation must
be written so as not to single out Native American religions, but to include
any religious group with spiritual ties to the national park. Should any law
providing such accommodations be written in a denominationally neutral
manner, it will likely pass constitutional muster.
138. Cutter, 544 U.S. 720.
